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Abstract

Th is paper investigates the theoretical relationship between economic reforms and inequalities in

socialist countries and tests it empirically in the

c訟 e

of China. Th e paper

argues 出 at

the issue of

whether market oriented reforms are likely to increase or decrease inequality in the former socialist
economies is an empirical question which cannot be settled by a priori reasoning. On the one hand ,
economic inequality may rise with the reintroduction of property income and incentive payments and
the reduction of barriers to opportunity for labor and capital

to 臼lly

realize their highest earning

potentials , On the other hand , inequality may dec1 ine with the decentralization of property rights ,
information and the reduction of barriers to the movement of goods and productive factors.

Th e

Chinese experience shows that economic inequalities did not increase but dec1 ine slightly during the
first stage of the reforms. But they rose during the second stage of the reforms. Hence , the Chinese
experience is largely congruent with the Szelenyi- Manchin hypothesis.

Socialism has many definitions but one feature all agree on is that it attempts to ensure the
benefits of economic growth are distributed equitably. To the extent that market-oriented reforms are
accompanied by increasing , inequality 出 ey become less compatible with socialism. Hence the
survival of China's socialism in future depends on the critical relationship between economic reforms
and inequality.
Th e purpose of this paper is to examine (a) the trends of inequality and stratification in China
under the reforms and (b) to find out whether or not there is a correlation between the reforms and
inequality in 也 at country.
Th e paper is divid 叫 into several sections. Th e first surveys the Ii terature in respect to the
theories explaining the Iink between economic reforms and inequality. Section 11 presents a statistical
analysis of income inequality during the reform period. Section 111 explores the sources of income
inequality. Section IV examines other aspects of economic inequality and Section V takes a closer
look at the rural poor. Th e paper concludes wi出 a summary of the findings and some comments on
inequality in China in the near future.

Market-oriented Reform and Inequality
Despite its significance for the survival of socialism theoretical investigations into 出e
relationship between reforms and inequality in socialist countries are few. Most studies are empirical
ones , the most notable of which are those of Flakierski , Whyte , Walder , Nolan , Griffin and Cha i.
Among , the few theoretical attempts to explain the nature of this relationship we can
distinguish three schools of 出 ought; namely. (1) the classical school , (2) the neo-liberal school , and
(3) the barrier approach.
Th e classical school holds that reforms are likely to result in increasing , economic inequality
because of (1) the reintroduction of property income , (2) the reintroduction of incentive payments ,
and (3) the widening of wage differentials.

A useful approach to analyze income inequality is to treat personal income ωcomposed of
two parts , namely wage and property income. Hence the variation of personal income depends on
the following , factors: (1) Th e relative shares of wage and property income , (2) the wage and
property income di旺'erentials , and (3) the correlation of the distribution of these two types of income
between individuals. 1
By definition property income in a socialist economy is absent or negligible. Th is is true even
if one considers real income or income in kind , since the property income in the form of surplus
produced by capital assets is siphoned 0 旺 by the state and redistributed more or less on an egalitarian
basis to individuals either in the form of transfer payments or public consumer goods. Hence , the
variation of property income in a socialist society , whether nominal or real , is likely to be very
limited.
Similarly , it can reasonably be conjectured 出 at the correlation between labor and property
income in a socia1 ist society is likely to be nonexisten t. In contrast to capitalist countries the variation
of income in a socialist society is further reduced by the relatively small variation of wage income
due to the ideological commitment to equality. Hence , one would in general expect the inequality
of income to be less in socialist countries than in capitalist ones.
Economic reforms involve the decentralization of property rights and a change in the

preference structure of the politicalleadership. Th e former allows individuals to own capital assets
and to earn property income. Since property income is less equally distributed than wage income
reforms are expected to aggravate overall income inequa1 ity. In order to maximize surplus and
labor supply as well as productivity the politica1 leadership must to some degree be willing , to
compromise equality for the sake of growth. Individual achievement motivation must be stimulated
through better rewards , e.g. incentive pay and 1 紅ger wage differentials. Since the wage income is
more important in tota1 persona1 income 出 an property income a greater variation of wage income is
seen by the c1assical school as the major contributing , factor towards increased income inequa1 ity
under economic reforms.
Th e neo-liberal school , represented by Szelenyi , Whyte and Nee see control rights as an
equa11y important variable as monet紅y income contributing to inequa1 ity. Th erefore ，出 eyar息時也at
income distribution in socia1 ist countries is unequa1, especially when there is a high concentration of
control rights. Th e greater equality of monetary income in socialist countries is merely an illusion
for real income is hidden in highly centralized economies through the existence of prerequisites and
other valuable privileges accompanying power.

According , to Szelenyi property income in a socialist society is centralized in the state budget
and redistributed by the state in the form of income in kind and subsidies. However , state
redistributors as a c1 ass are 'selfish' and 'favour' their own kind. Hence property income is mainly
distributed to the already privileged and/or in power as evident from the higher non-wage
compensation for the 'redistributive' c1 ass , such as housing" access to better education and medical
facilities as well as subsidies which are only partially reflected in wage income.
Economic reforms of socialist systems inevitably require the decentralization of property
rights. Th is , together with the shift from bureaucratic to market allocation of goods and factors ,
reduces the power and control rights of the state bureaucrats. Hence , neo-liberals hold 出 at reforms
lead to a more equal distribution of the control and income rights of capital assets , and thereby
decrease income inequal ity.
While the consideration of control rights is important , the neo-liberal approach suffers severa1
major analytical weaknesses. Firstly , it focuses primarily on the distribution of income between two
social c1 asses only , namely the state bureaucrats and the immediate producers. Th erefore it is
essentially a macro-theory of income distribution but as such it yields litt1 e insight into the size
distribution of income within these two groups.
Secondly , it is a static approach and does not take into account the effect of individua1
capital accumulation on property income. When this is permitted the variation of initial income
among individuals is likely to lead to a variation of savings and capital accumulation and fina11y to
increased variation in property holdings and income. Even if one were to start from a completely
equa1 distribution of property and income and assume 0叫 y a stochastic distribution of luck and 出 at
the rate of accumulation was proportional to property endowment , these assumptions would suffice
to generate an unequal distribution of income in a market economy (Adelman and Robinson , p. 972).
Szelenyi and Manchin (1 986) later develop a more dynamic model and modify their
proposition. Th is argues 出 at after initial equalizing e叮叮ts of the market-oriented reforms , the
market creates its own inequalities. In the long-run these reinforce those generated by the
redistributive economy which leads to rising , social stratification as a result of reforms.
While this revision improves the model it stillleaves a major weakness in the approach. For
in view of the fact 出 at wage income normall y accounts for three quarters of all income the neo-liberal
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school underestimates the disequalizing ,
re-introduction of incentive pay.

e前'ects

of the widening wage differential and of the

Th e barrier approach argues that even in social ist societies there are some forms of market
allocation of goods and factors prior to reforms. Th ese markets are seriously limited and frowned

upon by governments. Economic reforms basically entail the dismantlinbg of these market barriers
and the shift from highly restricted to perfect markets of bo出 goods and production factors.
Th erefore an analysis of the distributive implications of reforms in a socialist system is not complete
without considering the ramifications of the reduction of these barriers. Th e reduction of market
barriers can either increase or decreases inequality of personal income depending , on the particular
p 訂 ameters of the socio-economic system (p ryor , 1973 , pp. 392-6).
1n a socialist economy there is a large variety of institutional barriers , n剖nely (1) barriers to
the movement of goods and factors of production which result from ideological biases against the
market; (2) barriers to the flow and use of information which are due to the high degree of
centralization of information; and (3) barriers to opportunities which resu 1t in a less than optimal
match of individuals and positions due to pe位y requirements , such as membership in the Communist
party , a proper family background etc ..
Barriers to information and the movement of goods and factors of production keep them from
moving to areas where they fetch the highest price and cause wide dispersions of prices for particular
goods or factors over the economy. Hence , they result in relatively greater inequality. Th e
neo-classical general equilibrium analysis predicts 出 at a reduction of these barriers reduces the
difference in factor prices between regions , industries , firms and individuals , and , hence , decreases
the variation of total income.
U nlike the latter the barrier to opportunities for labor and 1 capital forestall a meritocracy and
thereby serve to decrease inequality. Economic reforms lift these barriers and allow labor and capital
to pursue their optimal allocation and highest productivity and income , and , hence , are likely to
generate wider dispersion of pay and greater income inequality.
Th e conclusion from the discussion of theories is that the impacts of reforms on income
distribution are diverse and depend on specific societal conditions. A priori reasoning tends to
simplify issues and it does not explain the diverse impacts sufficiently. On the one hand , economic
inequality may rise with the re-introduction of property income , incentive payment and the reduction
of barriers to opportunity for labor and capital to fully realize their highest earning potentials , as well
as the deliberate a位empt by the government to widen wage di 釘'erentials. On the other hand ,
inequality and stratification may decrease with decentralization of property rights and information;
and with the reduction of barriers to the movement of goods and factors of production. Hence , the
net effect of the reforms on inequality and stratification can only be empirically assessed on a case
by case basis.

Trends in Income Inequality
Measures of inequality vary considerably for the same population depending , on the unit of
analysis , the measure of income and the time period covered. Th eir selection is often limited by the
availability of income data. 1n the context of China , the only reliable time-series data 扭曲 at of rural
and urban household income survey data by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB). Hence in the
following , discussion the unit of analysis is household income and specifically household income per
capita. Th e concept of income adopted here is 出 at of disposable income adjusted for transfer
payments and other receipts. Th e period covered is from 1978 to 199 1.
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Before we present the result of our statistica1 ana1ysis the limitations of 出 e officia1 income
data should be noted. As a recent survey by a group of Western economists utilizing , Western
concepts show ( Kh an et a1, forthcoming) the SSB makes no a110wance for the rental value of housing,
and its coverage of income in kind and subsidies is less 出 an comprehensive. Hence , the average
income of urban and rura1 households in China is systematica11y underestimated. However, these
limitations do not a1ter the relativity of income di前'erenti a1 s and do not a旺'ect our conclusions
significant1y. For our ana1ysis is b訟 ed on a consistent set of income data and our primary focus is
not the exact magnitude of inequa1 ity in China in comparison with other countries but the time trend
during the 14 ye訂s of reforms.
Income di釘'erenti a1 s within a country are prim缸 ily determined by income disparity (1). among
rural households , (2). among urban households , and (3). between urban and rural households , e.g.
the urban-rura1 income gap. With respect to 出 e fir泣， namely rura1 inequa1 ity ，也 e Gini coefficient
ca1culated by SSB revea1 s 出 at it h泌 risen significantly during the first phase of the reforms from
1978 to 1984 ( see Table 1) and 出 at the trend has continued unabated in the second phase as well.
With respect to urban income differentials the Gini coefficient , estimated from the SSB urban
household income and expenditure survey data, indicates a comparatively smaller dispersion of income
than in rura1 areas. Moreover, it declined from 1977 onward, with the Gini coefficient fa1 ling from
0.186 in 1977 to 0.168 in 1984 , whereas rural household income dispersion increased. However ,
the trend of narrowing urban income dispersion reversed in 1983 and 出 e trend of rising urban income
inequality since 出 en is unmistakable.
In the first period of reforms the trend in urban-rural income disparity paralleled 出 at ofurban
income differential. For the urban-rural income gap narrowed from 2.36 to 1 in 1977 to 1.70 to 1
in 1983. Since 1984 , however , it widened again.
So far we have referred to the urban-rura1 income gap of an essentially monetary nature.
However, the urban-rural real income gap , which includes income in kind , subsidies etc. , may not
correspond to the nominal one due to the above mentioned underestimation of income in kind and
subsidies by the SSB survey data (see also Lardy 1984). Provision of the income in kind in China
heavily favors the urban population. Kh an and his colleagues , for example , show that urban
households received 39 per cent of their disposable income in form of subsidies where訟 rural
households were in fact paying 2 percent of their personal income in the form of net taxes.
Moreover , these taxes include o n1 y visible ones. If invisible ones , resu 1t ing from the low purchase
prices for agricultura1 products paid by the government purchasing agency are included , the rate of
farm taxation is likely to be much higher. Th us , according to 出 e estimate of Kh an et a1 the real
income gap between urban and rura1 household in 1988 was at least 2 .42 to 1 instead of 2.05 to 1
但也 an et 祉， p. 109).
re的 on for the divergence between the rea1 and nomina1 urban-rural income gap lies
rates of inf1ation between these two sectors. Th e trend of urban-rural rea1 income
di叮叮ential can be inferred from 出 at of urban-rura1 real consumption disparity? According to Table
1 the latter roughly corresponds to the trend of urban-rura1 nominal income gap. For the urban-rural
real consumption gap narrowed from 2.9 to 1 in 1978 to 2.1 to 1 in 1985. Since 1985 , however ,
the growth of the rural real consumption standard has slowed , whereas 出 at of urban households has
accelerated. As a resu 1t, the urban- rural real consumption gap has widened again.

Another

扭曲 e di在'erent

Overall income disparity also depends on the percentage share of the urban population or ,
more accurately , on the share of the non-agricultural population in to叫 population. Given an
urban-rural income gap migration of the population from the low-income countryside to high-income
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Table 1: Structure of Income Inequality , 1977 - 1991

Gini

urban-rural
differential

ratios
urban

Year

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

rural

cities

(1)

(2)

cities &
towns
(3)

nominal
lncome
(4)

0. 186

0.294
0.307

real
consumption
(5)

in O/()

285
277
271
272
251
235
223
211
222
233
235
231
242

17.9
18.2
18.9
18.2
18.6
18.8
19.3
20.5
20.7
20.5
20.7
2 1. 1
2 1. 4

(6)

236

0.212
0.234
0.239
0.232
0.246
0.258
0.264

share of urban
population

0.161
0.121
0.158
0.168

205
183
170
171
172
195
198
205
210
202
218

0.158
0.158
0.158
0.169
0.178
0.180
0.175

Notes and Sources:
1.

2.
3.
4&5:
5.
6.

pp. 4-7 and Z. GNYNL 1992 , p. 23.
Estimate from SSB's urban household income and expenditure survey data given in .2 000 China's People' s
Consumptio!! , p.75 .
Estimate from SSB's survey data in Z. GTJN1. 1986 , p. 579 , 1987 , p . 694 , 1988 , p. 809 , 1989 , p. 729 , 1990 ,
P. 297 , 1991 , p. 277 and 1992 , p. 283.
As a percentage of income and consumption in the urban household , see SSB 1984 , pp . 167 & 169 , ZGTJNJ ,
1992 , p. 282 and .2 000 China's Peoole's Consumotior} , p . 60.
Ch泣， 1992b, p. 739.
Share of non-agricultural population , Ch型 ， 1992b , p. 740.

豆豆豆 1987 ，
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urban areæ可 will increase the overa11 dispersion of income until the time 出 at half the population lives
in urban areru、. Beyond 血 at further rural-urban migration wil1 decrease overall income disparity
(p erkins , 1988 , p. 639). As the data in Table 1 show , the share of the 'real' urban population ,
namely the non-agricultura1 population , increased during the first phase of the reforms but it did so
at a slow pace. Since 1985 , however , its rate of increase has accelerated significantly.
Piecing , together the evidence the overall income disparity appears to have remained relatively
stable or even to have declined slightly in the first phase of the reforms due to the combination of a)
the decline in the urban-rura1 income gap , b) the decline in urban income inequality , and c) 也 e
relatively stable share of the rea1 urban population. But from 1985 on , with a widening urban-rura1
income gap , an increase in income inequality wi由 in both the urban and the rura1 sectors as well as
a rise in the share of the urban population , the overa11 income disparity has been on the rise again.
Sources of Income Inequality
Per capita household income , y is defined as income currently earned' Y net of tJansfer
divided by the number of household members , n. Hence , y = ( Y + tr) / n. Since
income earned can be divided into wage income , W, which is related to employment and non-wage
income , P , which is property or other type income unrelated to employment , per capita household
income can be defined as Y ( W + P + tr) / n. Th is means 出 at per capita household income
differential or its variance depends largely on (1) the variance of per capita wage , property and
transfer income among , households; (2) the relative share of wage , property income and transfer
payment in total household income , and (3) the correlation among , households of these three types
of per capita income.
payments ，汀，

Urban Income Inequality
Wage income is the single largest component of urban household income. In 1981 it
accounted for more 出 an 94 per cent of urban household disposable income. And even though its
share has declined since then it still accounted for nea r1 y three quarters of disposable income in 1991.
Hence most of the dispersion of urban household income can be attributed to the variation of their
wage mcome.
Since per capita household wage income is computed as the ratio of total wage (average wage ,
W , times the number of employed , l) to the number of household members , n , or , W/n = l/n x w,
the variation of per capita wage income among households largely depends on the variation of the rate
of employment , l/n , and average wage and their correlation among , urban households.
Th e rate of employment of a household basically depends on demographic factors , especially
on the number of children and their ages. Every child reduces the rate of employment in the family
as it increases the number of dependents and reduces the mother's ability to be employed.
However , this a1so depends on the employment opportunities for housewives and availability of care
facilities for under-working age children.

In the pre-reform period the variation in the households' rate of employment was significantly
larger than that of their average wages. Hence , two thirds of the per capita income di在erenti a1
between urban households in the past can be explained by their rate-of-employment differential. a監控
China's Peoole Consumotior1 , 1988 , p. 68). Table 2 shows 出 at in the first reform period the
rate-of-employment di叮叮 ential between the highest and lowest urban income group declined. Th us
apart from the changing , demographic structure the reforms appear to have favoured the lower urban
income group by opening more employment opportunities for them. During this period the average
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jf able 2: Urban Households: Rate oC Employment and Average Income DiCCerentials

cities 2

289
287
245
240
233

1981
1982
1983
1984
IL985
IL98
987
988
989
990
991

R ate oC emolovment
cities &
urban vs
towns 2
rural3

199
194
190
186
181
176
165

cities 2

122
123
114
109
100
97
95
93
93
93
95

134
132
151
158
243

Avera!!e income 1
cities &
towns 3

159
167
166
180
193
195
193

urban vs
rural 3

160
150
152
156
189
205
209
219
225
217
229

… …

心的: 2.1. 1Ratio between
per per
M
highest and lowest income group in per cent
3. Ratio between urban and rural household in per cent

Sources:

,

豆豆豆，

1988b , pp. 15 , 27 , 38 , 51 , 64 , 77-8; ZGTJNL 1986 , p. 582 , 1987 , pp. 691 , 694 and 697; 1988 , p.
809 , 1989 , p. 727 , 1990 , p. 297 , 1991 , p. 277 and 1992 , pp. 282-3 and 306.
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wage di仔'erential among urban households has not declined but increased (see Table 3). S 。由e
declining. , rate-of-employment differential was the major cause of the levelling of the urban income
di仔'erenti a1 in this period.
In the second phase of the reforms the trend of the declining , rate-of-employment differenti a1
among urban households continued (f able 2). Hence it cannot be held accountable for the rising
urban income inequ a1 ity in this period. Th is , therefore must be due entirely to the increase in average
wage di旺'erential among urban households. Th is is confirmed by Table 3 which gives a detailed
breakdown of urban household income by income category. While the data are not complete (data
for 1986 and 1989-91 are not available) it shows 出 at between 1981 and 1984 the average wage gap
between the richest and the poorest urban households increased sligh t1 y . However , the gap was still
lower 出 an 出 at of the rate of employment for urban households. Hence it has not been able to
counterb a1 ance the income levelling , e仔'ects of the narrowing , rate of employment di叮叮enti a1.
However , since 1985 the wage cap between the urban richest and the poorest households continued
to rise and gradually caught up with the rate-of-employment gap among , urban households. Indeed ,
it became the major source of increasing urban household income disparity during this perioçl.
Since average wage consists of basic pay and incentive pay , the average wage di旺'erential
depends largely on the relative share of these two types of wages and their relative dispersion. It is
known 也 at under the reforms the share of incentive pay so 訂ed and reached almost half of total wage
by the end of 1990. As evident from Table 3 , the basic pay di仔erential has been very narrow and
become relatively stable during the first phase of the reforms. It even declined slightly after the wage
reform of 1985. Incentive pay differential , however , was much wider and soaring during the first
phase of the reforms as well as since 1985. Hence the di旺'erences in incentive pay was a major
source of average wage di旺'erential during the period under investigation.
Property or non-wage income includes both income from individual enterprises and property
income per se , i. e. any interest earned from bank accounts , plus share dividends etc.. Property
income was negligible during the first period of the reforms. Although its share in tot a1 urban
disposable income has increased from 2 per cent in 1985 to about 3 per cent in 1991 (ZGTJNL 1992,
p. 282) it is not yet an important source of urban income inequality.
Transfer payments in China consist of two types. Type 1 is provided by enterprises and is
known as 'other incomes from household employment unit'. Type 11 is provided by the state in the
form of price subsidies , child allowances , pensions and other welfare benefits. Social services (soci a1
benefit in kind) are not included in disposable income. Both types of transfer payments constitute an
important element of urban household disposable income. During 1975-91 its share rose from 16 to
25 per cent G..hi益， p. 282).
Th e distribution of type 1 transfer payments between households was rather unequal as it
largely depends on the financial situation of enterprises which employ the main breadearner of the
household. Th is is confirmed in Table 3 which shows 出 at the gap of transfer payment of type 1 per
capita between the richest and the poorest urban households was significantly larger than their
average wage gap. Th ere is also a pronounced trend towards rising disparity in transfer payment
distributed by enterprises. Hence it can be reasonably concluded that another major source of rising
urban income inequ a1 ity during , the second phase of the reforms was the unequal distribution of
transfer payments by enterprises. Some of these were in fact disguised wage payments made in an
a位empt to avoid payment of the bonus and wage adjustment tax.

In the a位empt by the government to improve the material situation of low-income groups ,
families with children , and pensioners the share of type 11 transfer payments rose rapidly in recent
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Table 3: City Households: Wage and Non-wage Income Differentials tI

Wage2

Non-wage2

Average
wage

Basic
pay

lncentive
pay

Transfer
payment 13

1981
1982
1983
1984

127
127
138
150

124
124
124
129

142
142
197
226

255
228
325
618

1985
1987
1988

157
157
171

138
132
133

210
225
263

322
353
400

Transfer
payment lP

322

Notes: 1. Ratio between highest and lovest income group in per cen t. Figures for 1985-89 are not
comparable with those of previous years because of the change in the number of income
groups.
2. Average per person employed.
3. For an explanation see tex t.
Sources: 豆豆豆，

1988b , p. 28 , 39 , 52 , 65 & 143; 1988a , p. 27; 1989 , p. 24
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years. In 1985 it made up almost 10 per cent of urban household disposable income and by 1991 it
reached 17.8 per cent , G坐丘， p. 282).
Data on the distribution of type 11 transfer payments by income groups are available only for
1988. Th ese show 也 at 也e cap between the richest and poorest urban households for this type of
transfer payment was about 3.22 to 1 in 1988 , which was much larger than that of the average wage
(1. 71 to 1). Hence the e前'ect of this type of transfer payment on income distribution is more
disequalizing than 出 at of wages. However , its gap was smaller than that of all other sources of
income (SSB , 1988 , pp. 2-3). Hence , in contrast to type 1 transfer payments the type 11 transfer
payments have a narrowing effect on per capita urban household income di叮叮 ential ， a finding which
is also confirmed by Kh an et al (p. 115).
Rural Income Inequality
Rural household net income is derived 台om two sources: agricultural and non-agricultural.
Despite the rise of township and village enterprises 佇VEs) and other non-agricultural activities of
rural households , earnings from agricultural activities still accounted for 72 per cent of rural
household income in 1991 (ZGTJN1, 1992 , p. 307). Hence , most of the variation of rural household
per capita net income can be explained by the variation of earning from agricultural activities. Unlike
urban households , a significant proportion of rural household earning from agricultural production
is implicit property returns or rent on land , the height of which depends on the land-man ratio (l d/n)
and the average rent received , r , or Pln = ldln x r. Since the land-man ratio depends largely on the
availability of cultivated areas in the region where farmers are located and average rent depends
largely on the quality and location of these lands the level of individual rural household income from
agricultural activities depends very much on spatial factors.
Earnings from non-agricultural activities accounted for about 25 per cent of the total net
income of rural households in 199 1. Its largest single source of earnings from non-agricultural
activities was wage income which made up 9 per cent in 199 1. Since wage income was derived
mainly from employment in rural TVEs , rural household wage income differential depends largely
on the degree of rural industrialization in the regions.
China is a country of vast di前erences between provinces and regions in terms of agricultural
productivity and rural industrialization. As a result rural per capita income varies a great deal
between provinces. For example , per capita income of Shanghai peasants in 1985 was more 出 an
three times that of those in the poorest province , Gansu (T able 4). By 1990 , the income gap between
the two had risen to a ratio of more than 4 to 1. Th e rising trend of the inter-provincial rural income
inequality is also evident from the estimated population weighted coefficient of variation which rose
from 0.7389 in 1985 to 0.75563 in 1990.
Th ere are several reasons why regional rural income disparity has increased under the reforms
since 1978. One of the reasons is related to the distribution of property or implicit rental income.
Prior to the reforms a part of the implicit rental income was siphoned 0旺 in the form of low fixed
prices for agricultural products and redistributed it on an egalitarian basis favoring poorer regions by
the government Another p 訂t was retained by the collective for capital accumulation. Since the
government applied pressure on the collectives in the more affluent regions to save a relatively higher
proportion of their net output 出 is also had an equalizing e前'ect on regional income distribution.
However , wi出 the introduction of the household responsibility system (H RS) , the collapse of the
commune system and the increase of agricultural purchase prices , as well as the decentralization of
fiscal resources , a large part of the implicit rent is now returned to the peasants 巴hai 1985) and
retained within the region of its origin. Th us the reforms have widened regional income differential.
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Table 4: Regional Disparities in Per Capita Net Income of Chinese
1985 and 1990 (in yuan)

Provincesl
Municipalities

Nation
Average
Eas t:
Beiiing
Tianjin
Shanghai
Liaoning
Shandong
Jiangsu
Zhejiang
Fujian
Guangdong
Hebei
Central:
Heilongj ian
Jilin
Henan
Shanxi
A吋lui

Hubei
Hunan
Jiangxi
Sichuan
Shaanxi
Wes t:
Guangxi
Ningxia
X 泣ang

Xingjiang
Neimenggu
Yunan
Guizhou
Gansu
Qinghai

Agricultural
Population (198 6)
的%
in million

Per Capita Net Income
1985
1990

848.2

100.0

398

630

3.9
3.7
4.3
22.2
68.0
5 1. 2
34.1
22.9
50.0
48 .4

0.5
0 .4
0.5
2.6
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.7
5.9
5.7

775
565
806
468
408
493
609
397
495
385

1261
1069
1665
776
645
884
1045
765
952
592

19.7
14.6
68.9
2 1. 0
44.6
39.1
48.9
28.7
88.3
25.0

2.3
1. 7
8.1
2.5
5.3
4.6
5.8
3 .4
10 .4
3.0

398
414
329
358
397
421
395
377
315
295

671
717
482
560
517
602
546
580
505
460

34.6
3.3
1. 8
9.3
14 .4
30.5
26 .4
17.5
2.9

4.1
0 .4
0.2
1. 1
1. 7
3.6
3.1
2.1
0.3

303
321
353
394
360
338
288
255
343

500
534
437
623
607
490
435
399
514

Coefficient of variation , population weighted:
0.7389

Source:

Ch泣，

Pωsan 的，

1992b , p. 738
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0.7556

Another important reason for it is the unequal distributive effect of the state agricultural
purchase price policy. Under the two-track agricultur a1 procurement system peasants were obliged
to sell a portion of their output to the state at a state-fixed contract price and were free to sell the
remainder on the market at market prices. Since the market price tends to be higher than the contract
price the two-track system caused 出 e e前'ective price received by peasants to vary with the size of
their outpu t. Th e average purchase price received by peas徊的 in rich regions , where output is high ,
is relatively higher 出扭曲at in poor regions , where most of the output is either self-consumed or sold
to the state at the low contract price leaving only a margin a1 amount for sale at higher market prices.
Yet another disequalizing , factor was the government policy of preferential development of
the relatively prosperous Eastern seaboard provinces. Th is 訂閱， in contrast to the inner regions , not
only received the lion share of state investments but was a1 so dec1 ared an open 訂ea where foreign
trade and investment restrictions were lifted and spec凶 incentives were 0叮叮 ed to attract overseas
investment 但且鐘， 1992). Th e increased inflow of state and foreign investments into this region ,
出ough concentrating mainly in cities , have benefited rural industries and the surrounding rur a1 areas
by expanding their market CKnhrht & Son 立， 1993 , p. 202).
Finally , the lifting , of the barriers to the movement of the factors of production across regions
should be expected to have an equalizing , e旺'ect on regional income distribution as capital inflow into
poorer regions and the movement of labor away from them should improve their economic situation
仔isdell ， 1992 , p. 86). Unfortunately , so far the rate of migration in rural areas remains relatively
low. Between 1985 and 1990 only 0.24 per cent of the 1990 rural population acred 5 and above
moved from one county to another G.bi丘， p. 210). On the other hand , the lifting of the barrier to
opportu nity for regions to pursue their own comparative advantage and fully exploit their
own-potential ei出 er in agricultural or rural industry enabled rich regions to crow faster and , hence ,
contributed to increased dispersion of rural income among regions.
,

Rural - Urban Income Differential
If transfer payments and receipts are disregarded the urban-rural per capita household income
gap is simply the ratio of per capita urban household wage income (number of urban wage earners ,
仙， times their average wage , w, divided by the number of urban household members , nu , or lu/nu
x w) to 出 at of rural household net income (number of rural income earners , lr , times their average
wage and property income , yr , divided by the number of rur a1 household members , nr or lr/nr x yr.
甘lÏ s ratio therefore critically depends on (a) the rate-of-employment gap , namely lu/nu / lr/nr , and
(b) the average earning gap , wlyr , between urban and rural households .

An analysis of the trend of these two determinants of 出 e urban-rural income gap is given in
Table 2. It shows that the decreased urban-rural income disparity during , the first phase of the
reforms (1 981-4) was mainly attributable to the narrowing , of both the rate -o f-employment gap and
the average earning gap. Th e increased employment opportunities available to rural households as
a result of the introduction of HRS , the lifting of restrictions on rural households in engaging in
non-agricultural activities undoubtedly contributed significantly to the narrowing , of the urban-rur a1
rate-of-employment and the income gap during this period.
During the second phase of the reforms the urban-rural rate-of-employment gap continued to
narrow. However , its pace slowed down. At the same time , after an initi a1 de c1 ine , the average
earning gap between the two household groups increased significantly. For while it was merely 1.56
to 1 in 1984 it widened to 2.29 to 1 in 199 1. Th is apparently was the main source of widening
urban-rural income gap in the second period of the reforms.
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Given the relative rate of employment in urban and rural households and the basic wage in
urban households , the urban-rural average earning , gap depends critically on (1) the workers' share
in firm profits and (2) on the relative price of agricultural and industrial products or the agricultural
terms of trade , and (3) on the input -o utput relation or productivity in both the agricultural and
industrial sectors. 3 An improvement in the agricultural terms of trade and productivity will reduce
the urban-rural average earning gap whereas its worsening will increase it.
Table 5 shows 也 at during the first period of the reforms the agricultural purchase price crew
much faster than industrial prices. Th is , coupled with the increase in agricultural productivity under
出e HRS , was one of the main sources of the narrowing , of the urban-rural average earning gap in
the period. In the second period of the reforms the growth of industrial prices caught up with that
of agricultural products and overtook it in 1988 resulting in the fall of agricultural relative prices.
Th is , together with the slowdown of agricultural productivity growth (Çh泣， 1992a) was one of the
factors behind the rising , urban-rural average earning gap. Another contributing , factor was the rising
share of enterprise and workers in firm profits under the management contract responsibility system
introduced in the second phase of the reforms 已且泣， 1991).
Other As pects of Economic Inequity
Another form of inequality lies in the unequal access to social services or social benefits in
kind. Social services such as health-care , education and cultural facilities provided by the state are
not in c1 uded in the disposable income and , therefore , do not have an impact on household income
differential. However , access to these services by the di 在'erent social strata influences overall real
income inequity. More importantly it crucially affects stratification, defined as the transmission of
inequalities over time and from generation to generation.
Th e reduction in stratification requires an equitable distribution of social conditions'. Access
to , and the quality of, education and health services in China , however , vary considerable from region
to region and between urban and rural areas. Th e distribution of these services prior to 出 e be desired
e缸益 1989).
However, the decentralization of fiscal resources under the reforms noticeably
increased local differences because of di 在'ering ， local financial capabilities 但立起血， 1988 ，且包盔，
1989 , HendersoI} , 1990).

With reg訂d to medical care, the available evidence indicates 出 at local as well as urban-rural
inequality to access has risen under the reforms. Measured in terms of the number of hospital beds
per 1000 population Table 6) , the urban-rural medical care gap first de c1 ined despite the demise of
the commune from 3.15 to 1 in 1975 to 2 .44 to 1 in 1985. However , this improvement was more
apparent than real because the change occurred not as a result of the building , of more hospital beds
in the rural areas but rather as a consequence of greater emigration from rural areas due to 出 e lifting
of migration restrictions. In the second phase of the reforms the growth of the number of hospital
beds in urban areas was twice as fast as that in rural ones which actually stagnated. As a result , the
urban-rural medical gap soared again to 3.27 to 1 in 199 1.
Oth er measurements of urban-rural medical care gap follow more or less the same trend. For
example, the gap in the provision of medical doctors per 1000 population first de c1 ined but then rose
again in the second period of the reforms.

Unequal access to medical care both within urban as well as within rural areas has also
increased. In rural areas the demise of the communes withdrew one important base of support for
rural nutrition and preventive health programs (perki 肘， 1988 , p. 640). Between 1975 and 1986 出 e
number of barefoot doctors declined significantly. Since 1986 the total number of village health
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Table 5: Index of Agricultural Purchase and Industrial Retail Prices , 1978-1990

仙的

a

u

(3) = (1) I (2)

(2)

100.0
122.2
130.8
138.6
14 1. 6
147.8
153.7
166.9
177.6
198.9
244.7
28 1. 4
274.1

100.0
100.0
100.9
10 1. 9
103.6
104.6
107.8
11 1. 3
114.9
120 .4
138.7
164.7
172.2

100.0
122.2
129.7
136.0
136.7
14 1. 3
142.6
150.0
154.6
165.2
176 .4
170.9
159.2

Annual average growth:
1978-1984
7 .4
1984-1990
10.1

1. 2
8.1

6.1
1. 1

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

e

ro

旭

-Eap
bdgr
VEIC
akd
ce oa',
ra
pr
••••••
I九

Retail price of
industrial
products

U

A verage farm
procurement
price1
in rural areas
(1)

Source: ZGTJNL 1991 , p. 230
Notel: All figures refer to state purchase prices only. 1978-84 figures include quota , above quota
and negotiated prices , and 1985-90 figures include contract , proportion and negotiated
pnces.
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personnel further declined (ZGTJNL 1991 , p , 778).
Th e village collectives which succeeded the former production brigades and teams continue
to fund medical care and education services and finance them by collecting dues from peasants as
well as their share in profits of rural industrial enterprises (Chai , forthcoming). 1n the least
industrial 泣 ed regions , however , resources from collective dues were only sufficient to finance public
utilities and pay for general administrative expenses. Only in the more industrialized regions , where
collectives own a significant number of rural industrial enterprises , are collectives able to obtain
sufficient revenues to finance social services in kind. Hence , access to medical care for peasants
varies widely across regions. 1n some areas it is excellent in quality and free of charge , in others it
may be accessible 0叫 y by payment of a fee and be poor in quality.

Within the urban sector unequal access to medical care is also evident from the distinction
between tenured and contract workers. Th e former receive 臼 11 medical coverage whereas the
growing number of 出 e la前er do not m位盔， 1989).
With respect to education the reforms brought some improvement in respect to access to
primary education. However , they also result叫 in a more bifurcated system and greater access
inequalities. Th e education system is divided into a 'mass' sector for 'slow' children , and a small
elite sector which is accessible only to the most qualified students. Not only has the gap between the
two sectors widened 惶逃鈕， 1990 , p. 299) but access to higher education has become more difficult
as wel l. Enrolment in higher education from senior high school on has generally declined during the
reform period. Between 1980 and 1987 more than 30 million youths dropped out from primary and
secondary schools and the drop-out rate continued to soar in 1988-89 cz.坦峙 ， 1992 , p. 145).
Th e unequal access to education between country and town is most evident from the declining
share of rural children enrolled in lower and upper middle schools (T able 7). Since the completion
of middle school is a prerequisite for entering tertiary institutions 出 is impl ies that their share in
tertiary level studies also declined.

Within the rural sector access to education also varies widely from region to region. Since
the government has relinquished its financial responsibility for education to the village government
and the collectives 位位盔， 1989 , p.14) accessibility to education services depends on the financial
strength of the village. Children in villages with strong , collective economies and highly developed
rural industrial enterprises need to pay only a nominal fee for relatively good educational facilities
whereas those in less industrialized regions have to pay relatively higher fees for poorer services and
facilities because of the lack of finance from other sources.
Poverty
Most of China's poor people are in rural areas. Th is section gives a general description of
the situation of China's rural poor based on data from a survey of China's 23 poor counties carried
out by 21 Universities in China in 1989 (D EDURC , 1992). Th is is followed by a preliminary
assessment of the impact of the reforms on the poor and an exploration of their chances to improve
their economic , social and political situation.
A Profile of China's Rural Poor

Th e picture of Chinese peasants in poor counties is a dismal one. Th eir per capita income
averages onl y 365 yuan per ye征 which is barely enough to cover their consumption expenditures.
While production costs are kept to a minimum 出 ey push most of them into debts . Th eir dominant
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Table 6: Number of Hospital ßeds and Doctors per 1000 Persons: Urban-rural Differential

1975
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

ßeds

Doctors

(1)

(2)

315
262
244
251
259
289
305
312
327

342
348
325
330
342
347
350
348
360

Note: 1. Ratio bertween urban and rural areas in per cen t.
Source: ZGTJN1 1992, pp. 77 and 789

Table 7: Percentage of Students in City , Town and Village Schools

1975

1980

1983

1986

缸)91

18
10
72

12
10
78

15
13
71

15
17
68

16
20
64

28
18
54

30
25
46

29
37
34

30
44
25

30
48
22

Lo wer middle school
City
Town
Village
Upper middle school
City
Town
Village

Source:

D缸盔，

1989, Table 3 and

ZGTJ 悶，

1992, p. 729
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source of income is from agriculture (61 %), followed by livestock , forestry , fishery and sidelines
(17.6%).
Th e average household size is 4.6 indicating not only that the ideal of the one-child nu c1 ear
family is not shared by the rural population but that peasants will increase the number of their
children if they can a征。 rd to do so (the poorest households average 4 .4, the better off ones 4.7).
Th eir crude dwellings generally utilize unprocessed raw materials only. Th ey are mud huts ,
wooden or stone structures with grass 曲的ched roofs etc. Th e average life expectancy of peasants
seems relatively low , for those aged 65 ye訂s and over the average drops off sharply.

Peasants in poor counties spend roughly half of their cross income on food (51.2 %) and only
13 per cent on c1 othes. Th eir unemployment rate averages 15.5 per cent and only 13 per cent have
access to jobs. On the whole their income 仕om employment in factories & mines (4 %), construction
and transport (2.2%) , services (1. 7%) , or salary (5.3%) remains margina1.
Th e survey divides China's rural poor into underdeveloped households (U DHs) , developing
households (D GHS) and developed ones (D Hs). Th e difference between them lies in being , caught
in the poverty trap with or without hope. For the UDHS , who make up 54 per cent of the sample
and represent the bulk of peasants in the poor counties , accumulate an annual debt of 50 per cent of
their gross income. Th e DGHS , which account for 29 per cent of the sample , make an annual debt
to the value of 20 per cent of their gross income , and only 17 per cent of peasants , namely the DHs ,
have a marginal surplus equivalent to about 9 per cent of their gross income. However , there are
considerable regional differences.
Th e UDHs and DGHs , which together make up more than 80 per cent , have less income ,
education , land and other means of production and job chances (as well as being in poorer heal出).
Th e UGHs also spent 10 per cent more on food than the DGHs and DHs (53 % versus 43 %) and less
on c1 0thes (3% difference). Th e DHs tend to spend more money on lodging (3.1 %, 4 .4% and 7.3%
respectively) as well as on weddings & funerals (1 0.8%) , gifts (9.3%) ，如 el and transport.

As discussed previously , there is inequality of access to social services between urban and
rural areas. Th is is aggravated by intra-rural stratification. For example , measured in terms of the
percentage share of sick children in total child population the state of health of children aged 0-14 of
the UDHs with 5.5 per cent is worse than that of DGHs and DHs with 3.2 per cen t. Th e intra-rural
health gap widens with age. Th e percentage of the sick in the 15-64 age group for UDHs with 13.9
per cent is more than double that of DHs with 5.3 per cent and the picture is similar for the 65 plus
age group. Th ese di在'erences occur inspite of the fact that the UDHs spend nearly 9 per cent of their
total consumption expenditure on medical care while DGHs and DHs spend only between 6 and 7 per
cen t.
Causes of Poverty & Chances for Improvement
Only about 20 per cent of peasants in China's poor counties seem to be able to plan , organ泣e
and influence their environment to some exten t. Th e rest seem to be helpless. Th ey have no chance
of escaping the poverty trap simply because 出 ey lack even basic means of production. While
peasants own an average of 6.6 且且 of land 出 ey seem to work it with their bare hands for the
possession of plows (0.6 per cent) is as rare as 伽t of tools , pumps (tog的 er 0.5 per cent ) and carts
(0.3 per cent). Only about 1 per cent own a draught animal of any kind , the same is true for pigs ,
sheep and other animals.
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Not surprisingly , the lack of capital is seen by peasants as the single most important re訟on
for their inability to improve their lot It was mentioned by 87 per cent in response to the question ,
which factors kept them from getting richer. Th is was followed by lack of technology (34 per cent)
and only then by a lack of land (21 per cent ). Environmental restrictions are mentioned by another
20 per cent. Th e lack of labor and transport seem to matter little as yet for the still largely
self-su叮icient poor.
Correc t1 y or not , the lack of education seems to China's rural poor one of the le品t important
factors behind their lack of economic improvement. On average it was mentioned only by 4.3 per
cent of peasants , and in Jiangxi province it was even seen as less important 出 an the lack of
connect lO ns.
Th ere are hardly any prospects for China's rural poor to improve their inter-generational
stratification. Wh ile 血 ey generally tηto send their children to school every 10th child in rural areas
is missing out on education altogether. Of those children who do not attend school 36 per cent do
so for economic reasons. However , while better-off peasants keep their children at home because of
economic hardship as often as because of labor shortage , the poorer children mostly miss out because
of economic hardship. Th e latter tends to reinforce discrimination against girls who are three times
as likely to be left at home than boys for this reason. On the other hand , boys only are kept out of
school when there is shortage of labor.

1n summ缸y ， for the rural population in China's poorer provinces the reforms have increased
social di旺'erentiation to the extent of creating intra-rural cleavages between the bottom 80 per cent
and the top 20 per cent of peasants in poor counties. Only the DHs are able to improve their
economic situation marginal 旬， which they do more by way of more intensive agriculture than by
recourse to more sideline production. Th us the impact of reforms for the poor has led to some
structural differentiation but not yet to specialization. Th e bottom 80 per cent are neither provided
with adequate welfare nor with chances to improve their lot in the short-or long-run. Th erefore , on
the whole peasants are left as impotent in changing , their destiny as 出 ey have been 扭曲 e pas t.
Summary and Outlook
1n contrast to expectations by neo-liberals , the reforms in China over the last 14 years have
not decreased but increased inequalities. However , the trends are complex: overall income inequality
has remained relatively stable or even declined slightly during , the first phase of the reforms from
1978-84. But in the second phase from 1985 upto the present the trend towards greater inequality
is unmistakable. Trends in the other aspects of inequality , such as access to medical care and
education , seem to follow the same pa討ern.
While the distributive impacts of market-oriented reforms cannot be unambiguously
determined in thω 句， the Chinese experience suggests that they contribute to an initial improvement
followed by a de c1 ine in equality of income distribution. Th e initial improvement was mainly due
to the de c1 ining , urban income inequality and the narrowing , of the urban-rural income gap. Th e
former was due to the reduction of the rate -o f-employment gap between the richest and the poorest
urban households. Th e latter in turn was caused by the reduced differentials of both the rate of
employment and average earnings between urban and rural households.
As predicted by the barrier approach , the lifting of the barriers to employment in individual
enterprise activities under the reforms opened up relatively more employment opportunities for the
urban poor and , hence , reduced the gap in the rate of employment among , urban households.
Sim i.larly , the lifting of the restrictions for farmers to engage in non-agricu 1tural activities and in
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rural-urban migration has improved the rate of employment for peasant households relative to urban
ones.
Th e initi a1 decline in the urban-rural earning gap can in p 紅t be attributed to the
decentralization of property rights under the HRS and the resu 1t ing , increase in farm productivity.
However , it was also due to the policy of increasing , the state's agricultur a1 purchase price in 出 at

period.
Th e rise of income inequ a1 ity since 1985 was triggered by an increase in intra-sector

inequ a1 ity in both the urban and rural sectors as well as the widening urban-rural income gap
accompanied by a rising share of the urban in tot a1 population. Again , the market -o riented reforms
played a significant role in increasing , inequality during this period. However , state policies
reinforced the tendency towards growing inequ a1 ity rather than ameliorating it.
Th e rise of urban inequ a1 ity during this period was mainly due to growing wage differences ,
especially in incentive pay , for urban workers. Th e differential in incentive pay can in p 征t be

attributed to the market-oriented reforms as these create greater differences in reward in order to
generate achievement motivation._ However , they were partly a1 so caused by state policy , especially
since the state was reluctant to modify prope口y relations of and to introduce capital charge for
state-owned enterprises. Th us workers' pay contained an element of quasi rent and depended largely
on enterprise profi t. Enterprises with better access to state capital were able to acquire a quasi rent
which was then distributed to workers as wages , and hence , led to the growing , inter-firm wage
di叮erenti a1 s.

Another important source of the rising , urban income inequality since 1985 was the growing ,
differential in transfer payments funded by enterprises. Th eir distribution is rather unequal as it
depends largely on the financial strength and profitability of 出 e individu a1 enterprise. Since these
payments and their structure are a legacy of 出 e past , the inequality in income generated by it can only
be attributed to the state policy ra出訂出 an to the impact of the reforms.
Th e rising rural income disparity was largely accounted for by the growing inter-regional
rural income differential , most of which was due to the impact of market -o riented reforms. Th e
de-facto privatization of farm land and the collapse of the commune distributive system a1 10wed

peasants to appropriate most of the implicit rent on land. Peasants in regions with better land
endowments and better access to transport and markets were able to acquire a relatively higher rent
than others. Th e lifting of barriers for regions to fully exploit their own comparative advantage either
in agricultur a1 or non-agricultur a1 activities a1 so favored rich regions over poor ones. However , a
part of the rising region a1 disparity in rural income was also due to the government's preferential
development policy of the Eastern seaboard.
Similarly , the widening urban-rural income gap was attributable to the combination of market
factors and state policy. It reflects the growing urban-rur a1 average earning gap which in turn mirrors
the growing urban-rur a1 worker productivity gap. However , the increased inequality was p 訂tly a1 so
due to the state policy of depressing state contract purchase prices for agricultur a1 products below the
market value in order to extract surplus for urban-industrial development from rural areas 也盟h ，
1993). Fin a1 1y , the rising , share of the urban population in 出 e tot a1 population as a result of greater
labor mobility under the reforms also played an important role in increasing , the urban-rural income
differenti a1.
In the future the widening , of the earning di 在erential is likely to continue and perhaps even
to strengthen. For it must be expected that the share of the urban population is likely to keep on
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rising , a factor which alone will contribute to greater overall income inequality. Moreover , the
market reforms are expected to continue to generate productivity and hence contribute to greater
earning di叮叮entials between urban and rural workers. Th is trend is going , to be exacerbated by the
state's policy of controlling the agricultural terms of trade which is most likely to continue for the
sake of promoting urban industrial development wi也 the help of rural surplus. Th e growing regional
income disparities will also generate greater income inequality. However ，也 is factor is likel y to be
weakened by the greater regional mobility of labor and capital. Finally , the current urban pay
di叮叮ential is considered too narrow by the governmen t. Th e Gini coefficient of urban income
distribution barely reached 0.2 in recent ye缸s ， which according to the classification of SSB , is rated
as "extremely egalit紅ian" (Zhang & Lin , 1991 , p. 53). Hence an enlargement of 出 is di在'erential for
出 e pu叩ose of promoting , e在iciency and incentive is expected in the future.
However , the prospect of inequality in China does not have to be quite as bleak as described
above because the distribution of earnings between recipients is not necessarily identical with 也 at of
household income. Th eoretically the latter can be made to . di叮叮 from the former in order to
reconcile the conflict between efficiency and equity 位組垃泣， 1980).
To reduce the extent of inequality generated by market-induced earning differential the state
could, first of all , reform the fundic , of the welfare system. Since welfare provisions and services
are presently enterprise and local collective funded 血 ey exacerbate inequalities , wi出 the most
prosperous collectives and enterprises able to provide the more and better quality facilities at the least
costs to clients. Hence to arrest the rising trend of inequality social services need to be 臼 nded by
the state and distributed according to need.
Secondly , in order to prevent both 自己 enterprise and farms with access to better capital and
land from reaping excessive rental income , rental charges on both capital and land should be
introduced. Another factor which might alleviate the growing , earning inequality is the lifting of the
barrier to movement of production factors across regions. So far this has not had much impact
because interregional mobility of both labor and capital in China is still constrained. Hence the
development of a 臼 ll-fledged capita1 and labor market should help to ameliorate inequality in China.
Finally , as in capitalist society , a comprehensive progressive income tax could a1so make a
considerable contribution to the narrowing of the household income differential by decreasing , their
earning di旺'erenti a1.
Th e continuing accumulation of the debt burden by most poor peasants and the rising
stratification can lead to political group consciousness. Th is may generate considerable politica1
forces especia11y if the reforms continue to fail to provide adequate mechanisms for integration and
stability. Th e unmet basic needs of peasants and the uncertainty generated by the reforms are likely
to fuel unrealistic demands and possibly political unrest on the part of China's rural poo r.
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Notes:
1.

Var (ì) =

Var 仍 + Var 仆的 + 2Coν伊'的 where

income and var , variance and cov ,

2.

3.

Y is personal , P property and W wage

co-v訂 iance .

China's official per capita consumption data cover both private and public consumption and
are therefore more comprehensive in coverage of income in kind than the household income
survey data.

Th e urban-rural average earning gap is a ratio of average wage (b asic , Ws , plus incentive
income earners , lu , to the average net income of rural earners , lr. If rural
earning from non-agricultural activities and any fixed cost of agricultural production are
disregarded and if it is further assumed that all agricultural inputs are purchased from the
industrial sector , the average net income of rural earners is equal to total sales of agriçultural
products , EPa Qa less total purchase of agricultural inputs EPi Qi divided by the number of
rural earners or (E Pa Qa - EPi Qi) / Lr. Hence the urban-rural average earning di叮叮ential

pay ，明的 of urban

lS

(ws + Wb) / (E Pa Qa -

~Pi

Qi) /lr

If it is assumed that all inputs of the firm are purchased from the agricultural sector and if
any fixed cost are disregarded , then , because incentive pay of workers is linked to enterprise
profit , wb is equal to a (E Pi Qi - ~Pa Qa) /l u where a is the workers' share in the firm's
profi t. By simplifying and rearranging , the urban-rural average earning gap can be shown
to be

1/ (E Pa Qa -

~Pi Qi) ρr

Ws

+ a.lr / lu

(E Pi Qi -

~Pa

Qa)J
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